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An Error Probability Approach
to MIMO Wiretap Channels
Jean-Claude Belfiore and Fre´de´rique Oggier
Abstract
We consider MIMO (Multiple Input Multiple Output) wiretap channels, where a legitimate transmit-
ter Alice is communicating with a legitimate receiver Bob in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve, and
communication is done via MIMO channels. We suppose that Alice’s strategy is to use a codebook which
has a lattice structure, which then allows her to perform coset encoding. We analyze Eve’s probability
of correctly decoding the message Alice meant to Bob, and from minimizing this probability, we derive
a code design criterion for MIMO lattice wiretap codes. The case of block fading channels is treated
similarly, and fast fading channels are derived as a particular case. The Alamouti code is carefully
studied as an illustration of the analysis provided.
Index Terms
Code design criterion, Epstein zeta function, Error probability, Fading channels, MIMO channels,
Wiretap channels.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wiretap channels were introduced by Wyner [21] in the seventies as broadcast channels,
where a legitimate transmitter Alice communicates with a legitimate receiver Bob through a
noisy communication channel in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve. They have attracted a
regain of interest recently, in particular in the context of physical layer security. We consider
MIMO (Multiple Input Multiple Output) wiretap channels, for which the secrecy capacity, that is
Jean-Claude Belfiore is with Telecom ParisTech, CNRS, UMR 5141, France. Fre´de´rique Oggier is with Division of
Mathematical Sciences, School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
Email:belfiore@telecom-paristech.fr, frederique@ntu.edu.sg. Part of this work appeared as an invited paper in ICC 2011 [3].
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2the maximum amount of information that Alice can transmit confidentially to Bob, is known [10],
[14], [12]. We consider an alternative approach, which consists of studying the probability that
Eve correctly decodes the message meant to Bob, as initiated in [2], [15] for Gaussian channels.
An early work by Hero [9] proposed a non-information theoretical approach to secrecy in MIMO
channels, where a code design was proposed, based on the assumption that Eve is doing a non-
coherent decoding. In [20], the model of wiretap channel is further used to study secret sharing
over fast fading MIMO channels.
We consider the case where Alice transmits lattice codes using coset encoding, which requires
two nested lattices Λe ⊂ Λb, and Alice encodes her data in the coset representatives of Λb/Λe.
Both Bob and Eve try to decode using coset decoding. It was shown in [2] for Gaussian channels
that a wiretap coding strategy is to design Λb for Bob (since Alice knows Bob’s channel, she can
ensure he will decode with high probability), while Λe is chosen to maximize Eve’s confusion,
characterized by a lattice invariant called secrecy gain, under the assumption that Eve’s noise
is worse than the one experienced by Bob. The contribution of this work is to generalize this
approach to MIMO channels (and in fact block and fast fading channels as particular cases). We
compute Eve’s probability of making a correct decoding decision, and deduce how the lattice
Λe should be designed to minimize this probability. A MIMO wiretap channel will then consist
of two nested lattices Λe ⊂ Λb where Λb is designed to ensure Bob’s reliability, while Λe is
a subset of Λb chosen to increase Eve’s confusion. More precisely, we prove that to minimize
Eve’s average probability of correct decoding, a code design is
min
Λe
∑
x∈Λe\{0}
1
det(XX∗)ne+T
where ne is Eve’s number of antennas, T is the coherence time of the MIMO channel, and x
is the vectorized codeword X . As a corollary, we derive a design criterion for a block fading
channels where all numbers of antennas are the same, namely
min
Λe
∑
x∈Λe\{0}
1
(
∏n
i=1 ||xi||2)1+T
which in turn gives a criterion for a fast fading channel:
min
Λe
∑
x∈Λe\{0}
1
(
∏n
i=1 |xi|2)2
.
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3This paper is organized as follows: in Section II, we recall how Eve’s probability of correct
decision is derived for Gaussian channels, and extend the computation to include the case where
low dimensional lattice codes are used. Section III is the chore part of this paper, which contains
Eve’s probability of correctly decoding the confidential message when her channel from Alice
is a MIMO channel. We consequently treat the case of block and fast fading channels in Section
IV. The relevance of our approach is illustrated in Section V where the Alamouti code is studied
following the newly introduced techniques.
II. GAUSSIAN CHANNELS
We first consider a Gaussian wiretap channel, modeled by
y = x+ vb
z = x+ ve
(1)
over n complex channel uses, where x ∈ Cn is the transmitted signal, vb ∈ Cn and ve ∈ Cn
denote the Gaussian noise at Bob, respectively Eve’s side, both with coefficients which are zero
mean, and have respective variance σ2b and σ2e , where σe is assumed larger than σb. We assume
that Alice knows Bob’s channel σb, and uses Z[i]−lattice codes, namely x ∈ Λ, where Λ is an
m-dimensional complex lattice1, which can be described by its generator matrix M [5]:
Λ = {x = Mu | u ∈ Z[i]m},
and the columns of M form a linearly independent set of vectors in Cn (so that m ≤ n) which
form a basis of the lattice.
Alice performs coset encoding [21]: she chooses a lattice Λb that she partitions into a union of
disjoint cosets Λe + c, with Λe a sublattice of Λb and c an n-dimensional vector which encodes
her data. Alice then randomly chooses a random vector r ∈ Λe so that the transmitted lattice
point x ∈ Λb is finally
x = r+ c ∈ Λe + c. (2)
Why coset encoding is actually beneficial for wiretap lattice codes is illustrated in [15].
1Note that in the theoretical computer science literature, the dimension of a lattice is defined as the number of rows of M ,
whereas the rank of a lattice is defined as the number of columns of M .
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4Recall from [2]2 that when m = n, the probability Pc of correct decision when doing coset
decoding is
Pc =
1
(2piσ2)n
∑
t∈Λe
∫
V(x+t)
e−||y−x||
2/2σ2dy
=
1
(2piσ2)n
∑
t∈Λe
∫
V(Λb)
e−||u+t||
2/2σ2dy
where V(Λb) denotes the Voronoi region of Λb and u = y−x−t. Equality holds because infinite
lattice constellations are considered (this gives an upper bound on finite lattice constellations).
Since Bob’s received vector y is most likely to lie in the Voronoi region around the transmitted
point, the terms corresponding to t 6= 0 are negligible, which yields the well known bound on
the probability Pc,b of Bob’s correct decision:
Pc,b ≤ 1
(2piσ2b )
n
∫
V(Λb)
e−‖u‖
2/2σ2bdu.
Regarding the probability Pc,e of Eve’s correct decision in doing coset decoding, note that
1
(2piσ2e)
n
∑
t∈Λe
∫
V(Λb)
e−||u+t||
2/2σ2edy =
1
(2piσ2e)
n
∫
V(Λb)
∑
t∈Λe
e−||u+t||
2/2σ2edy
and since
∑
t∈Λe e
−||u+t||2/2σ2e reaches its maximum when u ∈ Λe (see Remark 2 in [11]), we
find that
Pc,e ≤ 1
(2piσ2)n
∑
t∈Λe
∫
V(Λb)
e−||t||
2/2σ2dy =
vol(Λb)
(2piσ2e)
n
∑
t∈Λe
e−‖t‖
2/2σ2e ,
where vol(Λb) is defined to be
√
det(MM∗). We need to discuss the case where m < n before
proceeding. The notation we will use refers to Bob’s channel, though the same holds for Eve’s.
The decoding rule for a Gaussian channel (1) when m < n is similarly to the case m = n
given by
min
x
||y− x||2,
where y = x′+vb is the noisy message at the receiver when x′ is sent, except that now, x′ = Mu′
and x = Mu where M is an n ×m complex matrix. By performing a QR decomposition of
M , we get
M = QR = Q

R′
0


2A real channel was considered in [2], the extension to the complex case discussed here is immediate.
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5with R′ an upper triangular m × m matrix, and Q a unitary n × n matrix, whose Hermitian
transpose is denoted by Q∗. Thus
min
x
||y− x||2 = min
u
||Q∗(Mu′ + vb)−Q∗Mu||2 = min
u
||(Ru′ +Q∗vb)− Ru||2
that is
min
u∈Z[i]m
∥∥∥∥∥∥

R′u′
0

+ v′b −

R′u
0


∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
where v′b is a new noise vector with the same noise statistics as vb since Q∗ is unitary. It is now
clear from the above minimization that
argmin
u
||y−Mu||2 = argmin
u
||R′u′ + v′′b − R′u||2
where v′′b is the noise vector v′b where the last n−m rows have been ignored (R′u′+v′′ is a vector
containing the first m elements of Q∗y), and thus the problem of decoding an m-dimensional
lattice in an n-dimensional space can be reduced to perform the decoding in an m-dimensional
space, showing that what matters is the dimension of the lattice, and not the one of the ambient
space. Consequently, we have
Pc,b =
1
(2piσ2b )
m
∫
V(Λb)
e−‖u‖
2/2σ2bdu, (3)
Pc,e ≤ vol(Λb)
(2piσ2e)
m
∑
r∈Λe
e−‖r‖
2/2σ2e , (4)
when Alice sends an m-dimensional lattice (living in an n-dimensional space) to Bob. We are
now ready to analyze the MIMO case.
III. THE MIMO CASE
We now consider the case when the channel between Alice and Bob, resp. Eve, is a quasi-static
MIMO channel with nt transmitting antennas at Alice’s end, nb resp. ne receiving antennas at
Bob’s, resp. Eve’s end, and a coherence time T , that is:
Y = HbX + Vb
Z = HeX + Ve,
(5)
where the transmitted signal X is a nt × T matrix, the two channel matrices are of dimension
nb × nt for Hb and ne × nt for He, and Vb, Ve are nb × T , resp. ne × T matrices denoting the
November 9, 2018 DRAFT
6Gaussian noise at Bob, respectively Eve’s side, both with coefficients zero mean, and respective
variance σ2b and σ2e . The fading coefficients are complex Gaussian i.i.d. random variables, and
in particular He has covariance matrix Σe = σ2HeIne . As for the Gaussian case (as described in
Section II), we assume that Alice transmits a lattice code, via coset encoding, and that the two
receivers are performing coset decoding of the lattice, thus nb, ne ≥ nt. Indeed, if the number of
antennas at the receiver is smaller than that of the transmitter, the lattice structure is lost at the
receiver. This case will not be treated. That ne ≥ nt might be assumed without loss of generality,
since in this case Eve is in a more advantageous situation than if she had less antennas. Finally,
we denote by γe = σ2He/σ
2
e Eve’s SNR. We do not make assumption on knowing Eve’s channel
or on Eve’s SNR, since we will compute bounds which are general, though their tightness will
depend on Eve’s SNR.
In order to focus on the lattice structure of the transmitted signal, we vectorize the received
signal (5) and obtain
vec (Y ) = vec(HbX) + vec (Vb)
=


Hb
.
.
.
Hb

 vec(X) + vec(Vb) (6)
vec (Z) = vec (HeX) + vec (Ve)
=


He
.
.
.
He

 vec(X) + vec(Ve). (7)
We now interpret the nt× T codeword X as coming from a lattice. This is typically the case if
X is a space-time code coming from a division algebra [17], or more generally if X is a linear
dispersion code as introduced in [8] where Tnt symbols QAM are linearly encoded via a family
of Tnt dispersion matrices. We write
vec(X) = Mbu
where u ∈ Z[i]Tnt and Mb denotes the Tnt×Tnt generator matrix of the Z[i]−lattice Λb intended
to Bob. Thus, in what follows, by a lattice point x ∈ Λb, we mean that
x = vec(X) = Mbu,
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7and similarly for a lattice point x ∈ Λe, we have
x = vec(X) = Meu.
By setting
Mb,Hb = diag(Hb, . . . , Hb)Mb,
Mb,He = diag(He, . . . , He)Mb
we can rewrite (6) and (7) as
vec(Y ) = Mb,Hbu+ vec(Vb)
vec(Z) = Mb,Heu+ vec(Ve),
(8)
where Mb,Hb , resp. Mb,He can be interpreted as the lattice generators of the lattices Λb,Hb , resp.
Λb,He , representing the transmitted lattice seen through the respective receivers’ channel, with
by definition volume3
vol(Λb,Hb) = | det(Mb,HbM∗b,Hb)| = | det(HbH∗b )|Tvol(Λb)
vol(Λb,He) = | det(Mb,HeM∗b,He)| = | det(HeH∗e )|Tvol(Λb).
(9)
Similarly, the lattices Λe,Hb, resp. Λe,He describe the lattices intended to Eve, seen through
Bob’s, resp. Eve’s channel, with respective generator matrix Me,Hb = diag(Hb, . . . , Hb)Me and
Me,He = diag(He, . . . , He)Me.
Note that for r ∈ Λe,He , we have
||r||2 = ||diag(He, . . . , He)Meu||2 = ||diag(He, . . . , He)x||2 = ||HeX||2F (10)
where ||HeX||2F = Tr(HeXX∗H∗e ) is the Frobenius norm, and x = vec(X) ∈ Λe.
For a given realization of the channel matrices He and Hb, the channel (8) can be seen as the
Gaussian wiretap channel
y = Mb,Hbu+ vb
z = Mb,Heu+ ve,
(11)
where y = vec(Y ), z = vec(Z), vb = vec(Vb), ve = vec(Ve). We now focus on Eve’s channel,
since we know from [19] how to design a good linear dispersion space-time code, and the
3Note that if Λ has generator matrix M , we define its volume to be | det(MM∗)|1/2 if Λ is real and det(MM∗) if Λ is
complex.
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8lattice Λb is chosen so as to correspond to this space-time code. We know from (4) that Eve’s
probability of correctly decoding is
Pc,e,He ≤
vol(Λb,He)
(2piσ2e)
ntT
∑
r∈Λe,He
e−‖r‖
2/2σ2e (12)
=
vol(Λb)
(2piσ2e)
ntT
det(HeH
∗
e )
T
∑
x∈Λe
e−||HeX||
2
F /2σ
2
e (13)
where last equality follows from (9) and (10), with x = vec(X) ∈ Λe. Note that as mentioned at
the end of Section II, the exponent of 2piσ2e depends on the dimension of the transmitted lattice,
which is here ntT .
Using Equation (13), we derive Eve’s average probability of correct decision:
P¯c,e = EHe [Pc,e,He]
≤ vol(Λb)
(2piσ2e)
Tnt
∑
x∈Λe
∫
Cne×nt
det(HeH
∗
e )
T e−||HeX||
2
F /2σ
2
e
e−
1
2
Tr(H∗eΣ
−1
e He)
(2pi)nent det(Σe)nt
dHe
=
vol(Λb)
(2piσ2e)
Tnt(2pi)nent det(Σe)nt∑
x∈Λe
∫
Cne×nt
det(HeH
∗
e )
T e
−1
2σ2e
Tr(HeXX∗H∗e )e−
1
2
Tr(H∗eΣ
−1
e He)dHe
=
vol(Λb)
(2piσ2e)
Tnt(2piσ2He)
nent
∑
x∈Λe
∫
Cne×nt
det(HeH
∗
e )
T e
−Tr
(
H∗eHe
[
1
2σ2
He
Int+
1
2σ2e
XX∗
])
dHe. (14)
By setting W = H∗eHe, we note that the above integral can be rewritten as∫
W∈DW


∫
H∗eHe=W
det(HeH
∗
e )
T e
−Tr
(
H∗eHe
[
1
2σ2
He
Int+
1
2σ2e
XX∗
])
dHe

 dW, (15)
where DW is the set of all nt × nt positive definite Hermitian matrices4. We have, since we
assumed nt ≤ ne, from Theorem 2.1 in [13] (see also [18]), that∫
H∗eHe=W
det(HeH
∗
e )
Te
−Tr
(
H∗eHe
[
1
2σ2
He
Int+
1
2σ2e
XX∗
])
dHe
=
pinent
Γnt(ne)
(detW )ne−nt+T e
−Tr
(
W
[
1
2σ2
He
Int+
1
2σ2e
XX∗
])
4Note that W is definite with probability one since He has full rank with probability one.
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9where Γnt (ne) is the multivariate gamma function which can be developed as
Γnt (ne) = pi
nt(nt−1)/2
nt∏
k=1
Γ (ne − k + 1) .
Now, Equation (14) becomes
P¯c,e ≤ vol(Λb)pi
nent
Γnt(ne)(2piσ
2
e)
ntT (2piσ2He)
nent
∑
x∈Λe
∫
W∈DW
det(W )ne−nt+Te
−Tr
(
W
[
1
2σ2
He
Int+
1
2σ2e
XX∗
])
dW
=
vol(Λb)pi
nentΓnt(ne + T )
Γnt(ne)(2piσ
2
e)
ntT (2piσ2He)
nent
∑
x∈Λe
det
(
1
2σ2He
Int +
1
2σ2e
XX∗
)−ne−T
(16)
where the last equality comes from [6]∫
DW
(detW )k exp
{−Tr (Σ−1W )} dW = pi 12p(p−1)Γ(p+ k) · · ·Γ(1 + k) (det Σ)p+k
where DW is here the set of all p× p positive definite Hermitian matrices.
We finally obtain that an upper bound on the average probability of correct decoding for Eve
is
P¯c,e ≤ CMIMOγTnte
∑
x∈Λe
det (Int + γeXX
∗)−ne−T (17)
where we set γe =
σ2He
σ2e
for Eve’s SNR, and
CMIMO =
vol(Λb)Γnt(ne + T )
pintTΓnt(ne)
.
In order to design a good lattice code for the MIMO wiretap channel, we try to derive a code
design criterion from Equation (17):
P¯c,e ≤ CMIMOγTnte

1 + ∑
x∈Λe\{0}
det (Int + γeXX
∗)−ne−T

 .
We can suppose that the space-time code used to transmit data to Bob is designed according to the
so-called “rank criterion” of [19]. This means that, if X 6= 0 and T ≥ nt then, rank(X) = nt. If
we assume now that Eve’s SNR γe is high compared to the minimum distance of Λe, or actually
design Λe that way assuming Alice knows Eve’s channel, we get
P¯c,e ≤ CMIMO

γTnte + 1γnente
∑
x∈Λe\{0}
det (XX∗)−ne−T

 . (18)
November 9, 2018 DRAFT
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We thus conclude that to minimize Eve’s average probability of correct decoding, the design
criterion is now
min
Λe
∑
x∈Λe\{0}
1
det(XX∗)ne+T
. (19)
Remark 1: We discuss the meaning of the bound in (18). The higher γe, the higher should
be Eve’s probability of correct decoding. The expression in (18) is decreasing as a function of
γe around the origin, a regime which we do not consider (as we just derived the expression
assuming γe big enough), and is then indeed increasing elsewhere as expected. The minimum
value of this upper bound (computed by taking its derivative) is achieved for
γe,min =

ne
T
∑
x∈Λe\{0}
det (XX∗)−ne−T


1
nt(ne+T )
.
Remark 2: It is important to notice that the upper bound was computed using an infinite
lattice Λe. In some rare cases, as for an example in the case of the Alamouti code discussed
later on, the bound happens to be finite even though the lattice is not. In general, it is not, in
which case the bound refers not to the infinite lattice Λe, but instead a finite subset carved from
Λe via a shaping region. The same holds for the bounds derived below for block and fast fading
channels.
IV. BLOCK AND FAST FADING CHANNELS
As a corollary of the analysis done for the MIMO case, we consider the particular fading
channels where Hb, He are diagonal matrices. In this case, setting nt = nb = ne = n, the
channel (5) can be rewritten as
Y = diag(hb)X + Vb
Z = diag(he)X + Ve,
(20)
which corresponds to a block fading channel with n transmit antennas emitting one after the
other, coherence time T and
diag(hb) =


hb,1
.
.
.
hb,n

 , diag(he) =


he,1
.
.
.
he,n

 . (21)
November 9, 2018 DRAFT
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However, we cannot use the final result for MIMO channels immediately, since the integral
over all positive definite Hermitian matrices does not hold anymore. Moreover, the general
expression of (15) does not hold either since it assumes that He (here diag(he)) is i.i.d distributed.
We thus start from the generic equation (13), which gives, using a polar coordinates change,
and the change of variables ue,i = ρ2e,i
P¯c,e ≤ vol(Λb)
(2piσ2e)
nT (2piσ2he)
n
∑
x∈Λe
n∏
i=1
∫
C
|he,i|2T e
−|he,i|2
[
1
2σ2
he
+ 1
2σ2e
||xi||2
]
dhe,i
=
(2pi)nvol(Λb)
(2piσ2e)
nT (2piσ2he)
n
∑
x∈Λe
n∏
i=1
∫ ∞
0
ρ2T+1e,i e
−ρ2e,i
[
1
2σ2
he
+ 1
2σ2e
||xi||2
]
dρe,i
=
vol(Λb)
(2piσ2e)
nT (2σ2he)
n
∑
x∈Λe
n∏
i=1
∫ ∞
0
uTe,ie
−ue,i
[
1
2σ2
he
+ 1
2σ2e
||xi||2
]
due,i
=
Γ(1 + T )nvol(Λb)
(2piσ2e)
nT (2σ2he)
n
∑
x∈Λe
n∏
i=1
[
1
2σ2he
+
1
2σ2e
||xi||2
]−1−T
.
We finally obtain an upper bound of the average probability of correct decision for Eve for the
wiretap block fading channel, given by
P¯c,e ≤ CBFγnTe
∑
x∈Λe
n∏
i=1
[
1 + γe||xi||2
]−1−T (22)
where
CBF =
(T !)nvol(Λb)
pinT
and similarly to the MIMO case, γe =
σ2
he
σ2e
.
In order to design a good lattice code for the block fading wiretap channel, we now try to
derive a code design criterion from (22):
P¯c,e ≤ CBFγTne

1 + ∑
x∈Λe\{0}
n∏
i=1
[
1 + γe||xi||2
]−1−T .
We can suppose that the code used to transmit data to Bob is designed according to the minimum
product distance criterion. This means that, if x 6= 0, then, xi 6= 0 for any i. If we assume this
time that Eve’s SNR γe is high compared to the minimum distance of Λe, or actually design Λe
that way assuming Alice knows Eve’s channel, we get
P¯c,e ≤ CBF

γTne + 1γne
∑
x∈Λe\{0}
n∏
i=1
(||xi||2)−1−T

 .
November 9, 2018 DRAFT
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This expression is decreasing as a function of γe around the origin, a regime which we do not
consider (as we again just derived the expression assuming γe big enough), and is then indeed
increasing as expected. The minimum value of this upper bound is achieved for
γe,min =
(∑
x∈Λe\{0}
∏n
i=1 (||xi||2)−1−T
T
) 1
n(1+T )
.
We thus conclude that to minimize Eve’s average probability of correct decoding, the design
criterion is now
min
Λe
∑
x∈Λe\{0}
1
(
∏n
i=1 ||xi||2)1+T
.
When furthermore T = 1 (and X is thus a n × 1 vector x) in (20), we get a fast fading
channel:
y = diag(hb)x+ vb
z = diag(he)x+ ve,
where all vectors are n-dimensional complex vectors corresponding to n usages of the channel,
and
diag(hb) =


hb,1
.
.
.
hb,n

 , diag(he) =


he,1
.
.
.
he,n


as before (see (21)). We can thus immediately apply the result (22) to deduce that
P¯c,e ≤ CFFγne
∑
x∈Λe
n∏
i=1
[
1 + γe|xi|2
]−2 (23)
where
CFF =
vol(Λb)
pin
and still again, γe =
σ2
he
σ2e
. The design criterion follows accordingly
min
Λe
∑
x∈Λe\{0}
1
(
∏n
i=1 |xi|2)2
.
We thus recover the expressions presented in [3], though here in the complex case, which explains
the difference in the exponent 5.
5Please note an erratum in [3], since the sum derived there is over all lattice points, while of course, the zero vector should
be removed from the sum.
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V. A MIMO EXAMPLE: THE ALAMOUTI CODE
In this section, we illustrate the code design criterion derived above using the Alamouti code
[1] with QAM constellation, nt = 2, ne ≥ 2 and T = 2. Note that the Alamouti code does
not form a Z[i]-lattice, but a Z-lattice. We choose the Alamouti code nevertheless since this is
the best understood and the simplest MIMO code available in the literature. It is not difficult to
check that our analysis, and thus the resulting code design, holds for real lattices as well. An
Alamouti codeword is then of the form
X =

 x1 x2
−x∗2 x∗1

 , x1, x2 ∈ Z[i],
so that
det (XX∗) =
(|x1|2 + |x2|2)2 = ‖x‖4 ,
where
x =

 x1
x2

 ∈ Z[i]2 = Λe.
The design criterion (19) requires to study∑
x∈Λe\{0}
det (XX∗)−ne−T =
∑
x∈Λe\{0}
1
‖x‖2(2(ne+T ))
= ζΛe (2 (ne + 2)) , (24)
where we recognize the Epstein zeta function of a scaled lattice µΛ (µ > 0), defined by
ζµΛ(s) =
∑
x∈Λ\{0}
1
µ2s
1
‖x‖2s =
1
µ2s
ζΛ(s). (25)
Since x ∈ Z[i]2 ≃ Z4, we will consider as possible lattices Λe either Z4 itself, with Epstein
zeta function (see Proposition 3 in Appendix)
ζZ4(s) = 8
(
1− 41−s) ζ(s)ζ(s− 1) (26)
or D4, in which case the vector x above is coded, and belongs to D46 instead of Z4, which in
turn involved the Epstein zeta function of D4 (see Proposition 4 also in Appendix)
ζD4(s) = 3 · 42−s
(
2s−1 − 1) ζ(s)ζ(s− 1). (27)
6The complex construction D4 = (1 + i)Z[i]2 + (2, 1, 2) may be used, for instance, where (2, 1, 2) is the repetition code of
length 2.
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In both cases, ζ(s) =
∑
n>0
1
ns
is the Riemann zeta function.
In order to compare the Epstein zeta function of the two lattices Z4 and D4, we rescale
D4 so that its fundamental volume is equal to the fundamental volume of Z4, that is 1. Since
vol (D4) = 2, the scaling factor is µ = 14√2 . Combining (27) and (25), we obtain
ζ 1
4√2
D4
(s) =
(
4
√
2
)2s
3 · 42−s (2s−1 − 1) ζ(s)ζ(s− 1)
= 3 · 24−3 s2 · (2s−1 − 1) ζ(s)ζ(s− 1) (28)
where s = 2ne + 4, which we have to compare with
ζZ4(s) = 8
(
1− 41−s) ζ(s)ζ(s− 1).
We eventually define the gain ςD4 obtained by using D4 instead of Z4 (the uncoded case) as
ςD4 =
ζZ4(s)
ζµD4(s)
|s=2ne+4
=
−2341−s(1− 4s−1)
3 · 24−3 s2 · (2s−1 − 1)
=
1
3 · 2 s2−1
(
2s−1 + 1
)∣∣∣∣
s=2ne+4
=
22ne+3 + 1
3 · 2ne+1
∼= 4
3
2ne.
We illustrate the obtained results on Figure 1 by plotting the upper bound (18) on Eve’s
probability P¯c,e of correct decision, divided by the constant CMIMO, when the Alamouti code is
used with as coarse lattice Λe either Z4 or D4.
Notice that when γe is small, this upper bound becomes of course very loose as it is a
decreasing function in γe, while we expect on the contrary P¯c,e (γe) to be an increasing function.
This motivates the following discussion the tightness of the upper bound (18).
We go back to the tighter upper bound (17) on P¯c,e:
P¯c,e ≤ CMIMOγTnte
∑
x∈Λe
det (Int + γeXX
∗)−ne−T
= CMIMO γ
−nent
e
∑
x∈Λe
det
(
1
γe
Int +XX
∗
)−ne−T
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ϕΛe (γe)
. (29)
November 9, 2018 DRAFT
15
1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Γe
P c
,
e
C M
IM
O
U
pp
er
bo
un
d
Alamouti Code - 2 receive antennas
Le=D4
Le=Z
4
Fig. 1. An upper bound on P¯c,e
CMIMO
: the Alamouti code with ne = 2.
When X is a codeword from the Alamouti code, with T = nt = 2, then
det
(
1
γe
Int +XX
∗
)
=
(
1
γe
+ ‖x‖2
)2
,
so that
ϕΛe (γe) , γ
−nent
e
∑
x∈Λe
det
(
1
γe
Int +XX
∗
)−ne−T
(30)
= γ−2nee
∑
x∈Λe
1(
1
γe
+ ‖x‖2
)2(ne+2) (31)
= γ4e + γ
−2ne
e
∑
x∈Λe\{0}
1(
1
γe
+ ‖x‖2
)2(ne+2) . (32)
We are thus interested in the calculation of
ζΛe (s, a) ,
∑
x∈Λe
1(
a+ ‖x‖2)s = 1as +
∑
x∈Λe\{0}
1(
a + ‖x‖2)s , a = 1γe , s = 2(ne + 2),
which will be done via the Mellin transform
M(f)(s) =
∫ +∞
0
f(t)ts−1dt,
thanks to which we obtain the following:
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Lemma 1: If a < ||x||2, we have that
1(
a + ‖x‖2)s =
+∞∑
k=0
(−1)k ak
k!
Γ(s+ k)
Γ(s)
(
1
‖x‖2
)s+k
.
Proof: The Mellin transform of e−(a+‖x‖2)t, for some positive a ∈ R, is
M
(
e−(a+‖x‖
2)t
)
(s) =
∫ +∞
0
e−(a+‖x‖
2)tts
dt
t
=
1
(a + ‖x‖2)s
∫ +∞
0
e−uus
du
u
= Γ(s)
1(
a+ ‖x‖2)s , (33)
which we can alternatively write as
M(e−(a+‖x‖2)t)(s) = M(e−ate−‖x‖2t)(s)
=
∫ +∞
0
+∞∑
k=0
(−1)k ak
k!
tk+se−‖x‖
2tdt
t
(34)
=
+∞∑
k=0
(−1)k ak
k!
Γ(s+ k)
(
1
‖x‖2
)s+k
.
Now (34) involves a dangerous exchange of an integral with an infinite sum. For it to be allowed,
we need to check that (
n∑
k=0
∫ ∞
0
| (−1)k |ak
k!
tk+se−‖x‖
2tdt
t
)
n∈N
converges for every t in the integration range, which is the same as showing that(
n∑
k=0
| (−1)k |ak
k!
Γ(s+ k)
(
1
‖x‖2
)s+k)
n∈N
converges for every t in the integration range. Since we only have strictly positive terms,
comparing the nth term with the (n + 1)th term yields, recalling that since s = 2(n2 + 2),
Γ(s+ n) = (s+ n− 1)!:
a
n + 1
s+ n
||x||2
whose limit needs to be stricly smaller than 1, that is
lim
n→∞
a
n+ 1
s+ n
||x||2 =
a
||x||2 < 1, (35)
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showing that the above computation is valid when a < ||x||2. We then have, comparing (33) and
(34), that
1(
a + ‖x‖2)s =
+∞∑
k=0
(−1)k ak
k!
Γ(s+ k)
Γ(s)
(
1
‖x‖2
)s+k
.
We are now ready to prove the following result for Z4. The equivalent result for D4 follows,
and the consequences of both computations for the bound on the error probability can be found
below in Corollary 1.
Proposition 1: Suppose 0 < a < q. For the lattice Z4, we have
ζZ4 (s, a) =
∑
x∈Z4
1(
a + ‖x‖2)s =
q−1∑
j=0
r4(j)
(a+ j)s
+
+∞∑
k=0
(−1)k ak
k!
Γ(s+ k)
Γ(s)
(
−8 · 41−s−k −
q−1∑
j=2
r4(j)
js+k
)
,
where r4(j) denotes the number of vectors of norm j in Z4. In particular if 0 < a < 2, we have
ζZ4 (s, a) =
∑
x∈Z4
1(
a+ ‖x‖2)s = 1as + 8(1 + a)s − 8 · 41−s
(
1− a
4
)s
,
and
ζZ4 (s, a) ≤
3∑
j=0
r4(j)
(a+ j)s
− 8 · 41−s
(
1− a
4
)s
− 1
4s
3∑
j=2
r4(j)
(
1− a
4
)s
if 0 < a < 4.
Proof: Since Z4 is an integer lattice with vectors of norm 1, we have ||x||2 ≥ 1 if x 6= 0,
that is we need a < 1 to use the above lemma. Alternatively, if we consider lattice points whose
norm is at least q, we can use a < q, which gives
∑
x∈Λe
1(
a + ‖x‖2)s =
q−1∑
j=0
r4(j)
(a+ j)s
+
∑
x∈Λe,||x||2≥q
1(
a+ ‖x‖2)s
=
q−1∑
j=0
r4(j)
(a+ j)s
+
∑
x∈Λe,||x||2≥q
+∞∑
k=0
(−1)k ak
k!
Γ(s+ k)
Γ(s)
(
1
‖x‖2
)s+k
=
q−1∑
j=0
r4(j)
(a+ j)s
+
+∞∑
k=0
(−1)k ak
k!
Γ(s+ k)
Γ(s)
∑
x∈Λe,||x||2≥q
1
‖x‖2(s+k)
=
q−1∑
j=0
r4(j)
(a+ j)s
+
+∞∑
k=0
(−1)k ak
k!
Γ(s+ k)
Γ(s)
(
ζΛe(s+ k)−
q−1∑
j=1
r4(j)
js+k
)
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where ζΛe(s) is the Epstein zeta function of Λ defined in (25), and r4(j) counts the number
of vectors of norm j in Z4. We were allowed to exchange both infinite sums since ζΛe(s + k)
converges, and thus so does ζΛe(s+ k)−
∑q−1
j=1
r4(j)
js+k
, for every k ≥ 0, and
+∞∑
k=0
| (−1)k |ak
k!
Γ(s+ k)
Γ(s)
(
ζΛe(s+ k)−
q−1∑
j=1
r4(j)
js+k
)
(36)
converges as well, which follows from
a(s+ n)
(
ζΛe(s+ n + 1)−
∑q−1
j=1
r4(j)
js+n+1
)
(n+ 1)
(
ζΛe(s + n)−
∑q−1
j=1
r4(j)
js+n
) ≤ a(s+ n)
q(n+ 1)
→ a
q
< 1
when n grows, noting that
ζΛe(s+ n+ 1)−
q−1∑
j=1
r4(j)
js+n+1
=
∑
x∈Λe,||x||2≥q
1
‖x‖2(s+n) ||x||2
≤ 1
q
∑
x∈Λe,||x||2≥q
1
‖x‖2(s+n)
.
The Epstein zeta function of the lattice Z4 is given (see Proposition 3) by
ζZ4(s) = 8(1− 41−s)ζ(s)ζ(s− 1)
and since s = 2(ne + 2) ≥ 8 when n2 ≥ 2, ζ(s + k)ζ(s− 1 + k) can be approximated by the
smallest value of k and s, namely ζ(8)ζ(7), where ζ(7) ≃ 1.00835. Thus
ζZ4(s+ k) = 8(1− 41−s−k)ζ(s+ k)ζ(s+ k − 1) ≃ 8(1− 41−s−k),
and, using that r4(1) = 8 (there are 8 vectors of norm 1, the 4 unit vectors and the same vectors
with a minus sign)∑
x∈Z4
1(
a+ ‖x‖2)s =
q−1∑
j=0
r4(j)
(a+ j)s
+
+∞∑
k=0
(−1)k ak
k!
Γ(s+ k)
Γ(s)
(
8(1− 41−s−k)−
q−1∑
j=1
r4(j)
js+k
)
=
q−1∑
j=0
r4(j)
(a+ j)s
+
+∞∑
k=0
(−1)k ak
k!
Γ(s+ k)
Γ(s)
(
−8 · 41−s−k −
q−1∑
j=2
r4(j)
js+k
)
.
In particular if q = 2, we get that∑
x∈Z4
1(
a+ ‖x‖2)s = 1as + 8(1 + a)s − 8 · 41−s
+∞∑
k=0
(−1)k ak
4k
Γ(s+ k)
k!Γ(s)
=
1
as
+
8
(1 + a)s
− 8 · 41−s
+∞∑
k=0
(−a
4
)k (
s + k − 1
k
)
=
1
as
+
8
(1 + a)s
− 8 · 41−s
+∞∑
k=0
(−a
4
)k (
s− 1
k
)
,
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recalling the definition of Gamma functions for positive integers. In summary, recognizing the
generalized binomial coefficients, we get∑
x∈Z4
1(
a+ ‖x‖2)s = 1as + 8(1 + a)s − 8 · 41−s
(
1− a
4
)s
.
If instead q = 4, we note first (this first inequality holds for any q but not what will follow)
that
q−1∑
j=2
r4(j)
js+k
≥ 1
qs+k
q−1∑
j=2
r4(j),
so that ∑
x∈Z4
1(
a + ‖x‖2)s
≤
q−1∑
j=0
r4(j)
(a+ j)s
− 8 · 41−s
+∞∑
k=0
(−1)k ak
4k
Γ(s+ k)
k!Γ(s)
− 1
qs
q−1∑
j=2
r4(j)
+∞∑
k=0
(−1)k ak
qk
Γ(s+ k)
k!Γ(s)
=
q−1∑
j=0
r4(j)
(a+ j)s
− 8 · 41−s
(
1− a
4
)s
− 1
qs
q−1∑
j=2
r4(j)
(
1− a
q
)s
.
The condition q = 4 ensures the convergence of the second series.
Proposition 2: Suppose 0 < a < q. For the lattice D4, we have
ζD4 (s, a) =
∑
x∈D4
1(
a + ‖x‖2)s =
q−1∑
j=0
rD4(j)
(a+ j)s
+
+∞∑
k=0
(−1)k ak
k!
Γ(s+ k)
Γ(s)
(
−3 · 42−s−k −
q−1∑
j=3
rD4(j)
js+k
)
,
where rD4(j) denotes the number of vectors of length j in D4. In particular, if 0 < a < 2, we
have
ζD4 (s, a) =
1
as
− 3 · 42−s
(
1− a
4
)s
,
and
ζD4 (s, a) =
1
as
+
24
(a + 2)s
− 3 · 42−s
(
1− a
4
)s
for 0 < a < 4.
Proof: The following computed above for Z4 holds similarly for D4∑
x∈D4
1(
a+ ‖x‖2)s =
q−1∑
j=0
rD4(j)
(a+ j)s
+
+∞∑
k=0
(−1)k ak
k!
Γ(s+ k)
Γ(s)
(
ζΛe(s+ k)−
q−1∑
j=1
rD4(j)
js+k
)
where we use the notation rD4(j) to denote the number of vectors of length j in D4. Note that
D4 has no vector of norm 1, and 24 of norm 2.
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From Proposition 4, the Epstein zeta function of D4 is
ζD4(s+ k) = 3 · 42−s−k
(
2s+k−1 − 1) ζ(s+ k)ζ(s+ k − 1),
and as before for Z4
ζD4(s+ k) ≃ 3 · 42−s−k
(
2s+k−1 − 1) ,
so that∑
x∈D4
1(
a+ ‖x‖2)s =
q−1∑
j=0
rD4(j)
(a+ j)s
+
+∞∑
k=0
(−1)k ak
k!
Γ(s+ k)
Γ(s)
(
3 · 42−s−k (2s+k−1 − 1)− q−1∑
j=1
rD4(j)
js+k
)
=
q−1∑
j=0
rD4(j)
(a+ j)s
+
+∞∑
k=0
(−1)k ak
k!
Γ(s+ k)
Γ(s)
(
−3 · 42−s−k −
q−1∑
j=3
rD4(j)
js+k
)
.
If q = 2, we can simplify the above expression to get
∑
x∈D4
1(
a+ ‖x‖2)s = 1as +
+∞∑
k=0
(−1)k ak
k!
Γ(s+ k)
Γ(s)
(−3 · 42−s−k)
=
1
as
− 3 · 42−s
+∞∑
k=0
(−1)k ak
4k
Γ(s+ k)
k!Γ(s)
=
1
as
− 3 · 42−s
(
1− a
4
)s
,
while if q = 4, recalling that D4 has no vector of length 3∑
x∈D4
1(
a+ ‖x‖2)s =
3∑
j=0
rD4(j)
(a + j)s
+
+∞∑
k=0
(−1)k ak
k!
Γ(s+ k)
Γ(s)
(−3 · 42−s−k)
=
1
as
+
24
(a+ 2)s
− 3 · 42−s
(
1− a
4
)s
.
The implications of the above computations for the error probability are summarized below
for γe > 1/2. Similar expressions can be obtained for γe > 1/4 (or smaller values of γe).
Corollary 1: Suppose γe > 1/2. We have when using Λe = Z4 that
P¯c,e ≤ CMIMOγ−2nee
(
γ2(ne+2)e +
8
(1 + 1/γe)2(ne+2)
− 8 · 41−2(ne+2)
(
1− 1
4γe
)2(ne+2))
while with Λe = D4
P¯c,e ≤ CMIMOγ−2nee
(
γ2(ne+2)e − 3 · 42−2(ne+2)
(
1− 1
4γe
)2(ne+2))
.
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Fig. 2. A tighter upper bound on P¯c,e
CMIMO
: the Alamouti code with ne = 2.
See Figure 2 for an illustration of the new bounds.
To conclude, we compare the loose upperbounds with the tight ones in Figure 3, and our
bounds on the probability of correct decision for the eavesdropper with simulations in Figure 4.
The coarse lattice Λe is Z4 (resp. D4) while the fine lattice Λb is 1/2Z4 (resp. 1/2D4) giving
rise to a secret spectral efficiency equal to 1 bit per real dimension. For simulations, we used
the linear ML decoder of the original Alamouti paper [1]. Decoding of D4 has been done using
the Wagner decoder of the binary parity check (4,3) code.
VI. CONCLUSION
We considered a MIMO wiretap channel, where Alice uses lattice codes via coset encoding
to communicate with Bob in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve. We showed, by analyzing
Eve’s probability of correctly decoding the message meant to Bob, that this probability can be
minimized by designing the lattice codes according to a suitable design criterion. The cases of
block and fast fading channels are treated similarly. We also illustrate how our analysis applies to
the Alamouti code, making explicit an interesting connection to Epstein zeta functions. Current
and future work involve a more systematic design of such lattice wiretap codes.
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APPENDIX
In this appendix, we compute the Epstein zeta functions of Z4 and D4.
Recall that the Epstein zeta function of a lattice Λ is defined by
ζΛ(s) ,
∑
x∈Λ\{0}
1
‖x‖2s =
∑
n>0
rΛ(n)
ns
(37)
where rΛ(n) is the number of vectors of Λ with a squared Euclidean norm equal to n. Note that
rΛ(n) similarly appears in the theta series of Λ:
ΘΛ(q) = 1 +
∑
x∈Λ\{0}
q‖x‖
2
= 1 +
∑
n>0
rΛ(n)q
n.
Proposition 3: The Epstein zeta function of Z4 is
ζZ4(s) = 8
(
1− 41−s) ζ(s)ζ(s− 1).
Proof: We have
ζZ4(s) =
∑
n>0
r4(n)
ns
where rN(n) is the number of solutions to the Diophantine equation k21 + k22 + · · · + k2N = n
(counting permutations and signs). We now use a result of [16, Paragraph 91], better exposed
in [4],
r4(n) = 8σ(n)− 32σ
(n
4
)
where σ(n) =
∑
d|n d and it is understood that σ(m) = 0 if m is not a positive integer. In
particular, this implies that ∑
n>0
σ(n/4)
ns
=
∑
m>0
σ(m)
(4m)s
.
We thus obtain
ζZ4(s) = 8
∑
n>0
σ(n)
ns
− 32
4s
∑
n>0
σ(n)
ns
= 8
(
1− 41−s)∑
n>0
σ(n)
ns
= 8
(
1− 41−s) ζ(s)ζ(s− 1) (38)
where the last equality comes from [7, Chapter XVII] and ζ(s) =∑n>0 1ns is the Riemann zeta
function.
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Proposition 4: The Epstein zeta function of D4 is
ζD4(s) = 3 · 42−s
(
2s−1 − 1) ζ(s)ζ(s− 1).
Proof: The lattice D4 is the 4−dimensional checkerboard lattice i.e., the set of all 4
dimensional integer valued vectors whose components have an even sum. Its theta series is
well-known [5] and is equal to
ΘD4 (q) =
1
2
(
ϑ43(q) + ϑ
4
4(q)
)
where
ϑ3(q)
4 = (
∑
k∈Z
qk
2
)4
= 1 +
∑
n>0
r4(n)q
n
is the theta series of Z4, whereas
ϑ4(q)
4 = (
∑
k∈Z
(−1)kqk2)4
=
∑
k1∈Z
(−1)k1qk
2
1
∑
k2∈Z
(−1)k2qk
2
2
∑
k3∈Z
(−1)k3qk
2
3
∑
k4∈Z
(−1)k4qk
2
4
=
∑
k1,k2,k3,k4∈Z
(−1)k1+k2+k3+k4qk21+k22+k23+k24
= 1 +
∑
n>0
(−1)nr4(n)qn
since k1+k2+k3+k4 ≡ k21+k22+k23+k24 mod 2. Thus the theta series of D4 can be rewritten
as
ΘD4 (q) =
1
2
(
1 +
∑
n>0
r4(n)q
n + 1 +
∑
n>0
(−1)nr4(n)qn
)
= 1 +
1
2
∑
n>0
(r4(n)q
n + (−1)nr4(n)qn) ,
showing that the Epstein zeta function of D4 is
ζD4(s) =
1
2
∑
n>0
r4(n) + (−1)nr4(n)
ns
=
1
2
ζZ4 +
1
2
∑
n>0
(−1)nr4(n)
ns
.
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Using again as in the above proof that
r4(n) = 8σ(n)− 32σ
(n
4
)
,
we get
1
2
∑
n>0
(−1)n r4(n)
ns
= 4
(∑
n>0
(−1)nσ(n)
ns
− 4
∑
m>0
σ(m)
(4m)s
)
= 4
(∑
n>0
(−1)nσ(n)
ns
− 41−sζ(s)ζ(s− 1)
)
since [7, Chapter XVII] ∑
n>0
σ(n)
ns
= ζ(s)ζ(s− 1).
We are left to compute∑
n>0
(−1)nσ(n)
ns
= −
∑
n odd
σ(n)
ns
+
∑
n even
σ(n)
ns
= −
∑
n odd
σ(n)
ns
+
∑
v>0
σ (2v)
2vs
∑
n odd
σ(n)
ns
=
∑
n odd
σ(n)
ns
(
−1 +
∑
v>0
2v+1 − 1
2vs
)
=
∑
n odd
σ(n)
ns
(
−1 + 2
2−s
1− 21−s −
2−s
1− 2−s
)
where the second equality follows from the multiplicativity of σ. Since similarly∑
n>0
σ(n)
ns
=
∑
n odd
σ(n)
ns
(
1 +
22−s
1− 21−s −
2−s
1− 2−s
)
,
a comparison of both expressions yields
∑
n>0
(−1)nσ(n)
ns
=
∑
n>0
σ(n)
ns
(
−1 + 22−s
1−21−s − 2
−s
1−2−s
1 + 2
2−s
1−21−s − 2
−s
1−2−s
)
= ζ(s)ζ(s− 1)
(
22−s
1−21−s − 11−2−s
22−s
1−21−s +
1−21−s
1−2−s
)
= ζ(s)ζ(s− 1)
(
22−s(1− 2−s)− (1− 21−s)
22−s(1− 2−s) + (1− 21−s)2
)
= ζ(s)ζ(s− 1) (22−s − 22−2s + 21−s − 1) ,
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and we obtain that
1
2
∑
n>0
(−1)n r4(n)
ns
= 4
(
22−s − 22−2s + 21−s − 1− 41−s) ζ(s)ζ(s− 1)
= 4
(
2 · 21−s − 2 · 22−2s + 21−s − 1) ζ(s)ζ(s− 1).
We finally obtain the expression of the Epstein zeta function of D4:
ζD4(s) =
1
2
ζZ4 +
1
2
∑
n>0
(−1)nr4(n)
ns
= 4
(
1− 41−s) ζ(s)ζ(s− 1) + 4 (3 · 21−s − 2 · 22−2s − 1) ζ(s)ζ(s− 1)
= 4
(−3 · 22−2s + 3 · 21−s) ζ(s)ζ(s− 1)
= 3 · 42−s (2s−1 − 1) ζ(s)ζ(s− 1).
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